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I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA).' Specifically, this article analyzes the first amend-
ment and due process implications of sections 1189 and 1182, which en-
able the Secretary of State to create a list of "foreign terrorist organiza-
tions," as well as analyzes the sections which criminalize international
fundraising and humanitarian 
aid.2
The AEDPA gives the Government enormous discretion to deter-
mine which political movements and organizations are legitimate and
which are not. A recent ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
4
challenged the constitutionality of this act. The court held that these sec-
tions violate freedom of association.5 This article will argue that under the
AEDPA, the black lists of the McCarthy era will reappear as official lists of
"foreign terrorist organizations" and Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice (INS) "watch lists" of suspected terrorists.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Terrorism Generally
On April 19, 1995, a Ryder truck carrying a 4800-pound fertilizer-
and-fuel-oil bomb exploded at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168 people and wounding over 600
others.7 On the one year anniversary of this tragedy, President Clinton
signed into law the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1. See8 U.S.C. § 1189 (Supp. II1996).
2. See id. §§ 1189 & 1182.
3. See id. §§ 1189(a)(1) & 1182(a)(3)(B). Special interest groups criticize
this large grant of discretion. See, e.g., NETWORK AGAINST THE "COUNTER-
TERRORISM" ACT, THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACr:
REPRESSION UNDER THE GUISE OF PROTECTING THE PEOPLE 3.
4. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045
(9th Cir. 1995).
5. See id. at 1063-65.
6. Not surprisingly, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) warns of
this eventuality:
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in terms of ur-
gency, when... rights seem too extravagant to endure ... when we allow
fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived
exigency, we invariably come to regret it... the first, and worst, casu-
alty... will be the precious liberties of our citizens.
THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTI-
TERRORISM ACT OF 1995 (1996).
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1996 (AEDPA).8 The purpose of this bill was to replace the then-existing
patchwork terrorism legislation, and insert a comprehensive policy which
would enable the government to fully combat both domestic and interna-
tional terrorism.
Terrorism is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as "[a] policy
intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the em-
ployment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing or condition
of being terrorized."'0 Today, terrorism is often defined as "membership
in a clandestine or expatriate organization aiming to coerce an estab-
lished government by acts of violence against it or its subjects. " "
B. The AEDPA of 1996
AEDPA section 1189 empowers the Secretary of State to create a list
of foreign terrorist organizations. The Secretary must find that the or-
ganization (1) is foreign; (2) engages in terrorist activity; and (3) threat-
ens the security of the United States or United States nationals.1 3 Conduct
within the definition of "terrorist activity" under section 1189 also includes
threats, attempts and conspiracies to commit such conduct.14 The Secre-
8. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1189 (Supp. II 1996)).
9. See Note, supra note 7, at 2074.
10. THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DIcIoNARY 821 (2d ed. 1989).
11. Caleb M. Pilgrim, Terrorism in National and International Law, 8 DICK J.
INT'L. L. 147, 150 (1990).
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (Supp. 111996).
13. See id.
14. See id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii). The statute reads:
[T] he term "terrorist activity" means any activity which is unlawful under
the laws of the place where it is committed and which involves any of the
following:
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an
aircraft, vessel or vehicle).
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or con-
tinue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person
(including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from do-
ing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the
individual seized or detained.
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as
defined in section 1116(b) (4) of Tide 18) or upon the liberty of
such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any-
(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or de-
vice, or
(b) explosive or firearm (other than for mere personal mone-
tary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the
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tary's decision may be based upon classified information. 5 This informa-
tion is not subject to disclosure, except for an ex parte in camera judicial16
review. National security under section 1189 refers to the national de-
fense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States.
1 7
Seven days before making a designation under section 1189, the Sec-
retary must notify the leaders of Congress of his or her intent. This no-
tice must include his or her findings regarding the organization's terroris-
tic activities and the factual basis underlying her decision.' 9  Following




Once designated a foreign terrorist organization, the Secretary of the
Treasury may freeze the assets of the organization in all United States fi-
nancial institutions.2 ' These assets remain frozen indefinitely, pending
further directives from the Secretary of the Treasury, an Act of Congress,
22or court order. 23
A foreign terrorist designation is effective for two years. The Secre-
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.
Id.
15. See id. § 1189(a) (3) (B). The statute reads:
The Secretary may consider classified information in making a designa-
tion under this subsection. Classified information shall not be subject to
disclosure for such time as it remains classified, except that such informa-
tion may be disclosed to a court ex parte and in camera for purposes of
judicial review under subsection (c) of this section.
Id.
16. See id.
17. Seeid. § 1189(c)(2).
18. See id. § 1189(a) (2) (A). The statute reads:
Seven days before making a designation under this subsection, the Secre-
tary shall, by classified communication-
(i) notify the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the President pro tempore, Majority Leader, and Minority
Leader of the Senate, and the members of the relevant committees,
in writing, of the intent to designate a foreign organization under
this subsection, together with the findings made under paragraph
(1) with respect to that organization, and factual basis therefore.
Id.
19. See id.
20. See id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(ii).
21. See id. § 1189(a)(2)(C). The statute reads:
Upon notification under paragraph (2), the Secretary of the Treasury
may require United States financial institutions possessing or controlling
any assets of any foreign organization included in the notification to
block all financial transactions involving those assets until further direc-




23. See id. § 1189(a) (4) (A). The statute reads, "subject to paragraphs (5) and
1188 [Vol. 24
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tary of State may redesignate an organization at the end of the initial two
year period.14 He or she must fulfill the same requirements as with the
initial designation.15
A foreign organization may challenge the Secretary of State's desig-
26nation. The appeal must come within thirty days of publication in the
Federal Register. The appeal is brought in the United States Court of
28Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The basis of the review is
solely upon the administrative record made by the Secretary stating his or. 29
her initial findings. The Government may also submit to the court, for
ex parte in camera review, classified information used in making the des-3o
ignation. The court must set aside a designation as unlawful if it finds
the designation (1) arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or not in ac-
cordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation,
or short of statutory right; (4) lacking substantial support; or (5) not pro-
cedurally correct.3' AEDPA section 1182 also makes it a crime to raise and
contribute funds, donate educational and humanitarian supplies, or to
provide lodging, transportation or other forms of "material support" to32
designated foreign terrorist .groups. The only exceptions to this rule are
(6), a designation under this subsection shall be effective for all purposes for a pe-
riod of 2 years beginning on the effective date of the designation under paragraph
(2) (B)." Id.
24. See id. § 1189(a) (4) (B). The statute reads:
The Secretary may redesignate a foreign organization as a foreign terror-
ist organization for an additional 2-year period at the end of the 2-year
period referred to in subparagraph (A) (but not sooner than 60 days
prior to the termination of such period) upon a finding that the relevant
circumstances described in paragraph (1) still exist. The procedural re-




26. See id. § 1189 (b) (1). The statute reads:
Not later than 30 days after publication of the designation in the Federal
Register, an organization designated as a foreign terrorist organization
may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of




29. See id. § 1189(b)(2). The statute reads: "Review under this subsection
shall be based solely upon the administrative record, except that the Government
may submit, for ex parte and in camera review, classified information used in mak-
ing the designation." Id.
30. See id.
31. Seeid. § 1189(b)(3)(A)-(E).
32. See id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). The statute reads:
(III) Engage in terrorist activity defined: As used in this chapter, the term
.engage in terrorist activity" means to commit, in an individual capacity
19981 1189
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medicine and religious materials.3  This could prohibit making donations
to the legal defense funds of Zapatista or IRA political prisoners, or send-
ing funds or supplies to medical clinics and Islamic schools in the Palestin-
ian West Bank. Even attempts and conspiracies to provide such aid
could be prohibited.3 5 Those convicted of this new federal crime will face
up to ten years in prison.36
C. The First Amendment and the Freedom of Association
1. The Origin of the Freedom of Association
For more than the first one hundred years after its ratification, the
First Amendment was held to prohibit prior restraint by the federal gov-• , •37
ernment, and little if anything else. The phrase "Congress shall make no
law" was strictly construed. States were free to regulate speech, but re-
strictions by the federal government were limited.39
Freedom of expression encompasses freedom of speech, freedom of
the press, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and freedom to
petition the government for redress.40 The Supreme Court has written
that freedom of expression is "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom." 4 1 Other fundamental rights, such as
or as a member of an organization, an act of terrorist activity or an act
which the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material sup-
port to any individual, organization, or government in conducting a ter-
rorist activity at any time, including any of the following acts:...
(IV) The soliciting of funds or other things of value for terrorist activity
or for any terrorist organization.
(V) The solicitation of any individual for membership in a terrorist or-
ganization, terrorist government, or to engage in a terrorist activity.
Id.
33. See id.
34. See NETWORK AGAINST THE "COUNTER-TERRORISM" ACT, THE ANTI-
TERRORISM AND ErrEcrivE DEATH PENALTY ACT: REPRESSION UNDER THE GUISE OF
PROTECTING THE PEOPLE 3.
35. See8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (ii) (VI) (Supp. 111996).
36. See id. § 1182.
37. See JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrUTIONAL LAw 1008
(5th ed. 1995) (stating that the First Amendment directive that "Congress shall
make no law" was generally followed).
38. See id.; see also Robert Plotkin, First Amendment Challenges To The Membership
and Advocacy Provisions of The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 10
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 623, 626-627 (1996).
39. See NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 37, at 1008; see also Plotkin, supra note
38, at 627. "Although the language of the First Amendment prohibiting regula-
tion of speech might seem clear cut and absolute to modern eyes, it was essentially
unenforced until the twentieth century." Id.
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the right to vote, could not exist without 
it.4 2
The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that the free-
dom of association is a fundamental right protected by the First Amend-
ment." The Court held that although "association" does not appear in
the actual wording of the Amendment, "freedom to engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of 'lib-
erty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech." 44
Freedom of association is considered essential to the speech and as-
sembly provisions protected by the First Amendment.45 The Supreme
Court stated "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group as-
sociation."" The Court further observed that an "individual's freedom to
speak, to worship, and to petition the Government for redress of griev-
ances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the state un-
less a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends
were not also guaranteed.""
42. See id.
43. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). See also
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & PoLIciES 943, 944 (1997)
(stating that the freedom of association is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
First Amendment); see alsoJoan Steinman, Privacy of Association: A Burgeoning Privi-
lege in Civil Discovery 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355, 360 (1982) (stating
"[f]reedom of association has itself consistently been recognized as implicitly
guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution.").
44. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at
943; Steinman, supra note 43, at 360. "Compelled disclosure of affiliation with
groups engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] effective ... restraint on freedom
of association .... Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many cir-
cumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particu-
larly where a group espouses dissident beliefs." Id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. at 462).
45. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 943.
46. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460. In this case, the Court declared un-
constitutional an Alabama law which required that out-of-state corporations meet
certain disclosure requirements. See id. at 449. In connection with this law, Ala-
bama required disclosure of the NAACP's membership lists. See id.
47. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). In Roberts, the
United States Jaycees brought suit challenging the Minnesota Human Rights Act
which ordered them to admit women to its local Minnesota chapters. See id. at
609. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, explained that the application of the
Minnesota Act compelling the Jaycees' acceptance of women as regular members
did not constitute an abridgement of the members' freedom of association. See id.
at 630-631. See generally Ronald Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of
Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1001 (1983) (providing an overview of the rights of
groups under the Constitution).
1998]
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2. Historical Treatment by Congress
In September 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt, in his first speech
to Congress, urged legislators to exclude aliens who acted on anarchist
principles, who simply believed in or espoused anarchist principles, or48
those aliens who belonged to anarchist societies. Roosevelt's speech
marked the first time in American history that a president gave sanction to
find guilt by association. 49
Congress responded to Roosevelt's call by enacting the Immigration
Act of 1903." This Act was the first immigration legislation to exclude
persons solely on the basis of their ideology or affiliation, rather than their
actual activity.' The Act excluded "anarchists, or persons who believe in
or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the government of the
United States... or of all forms of law .... 5' The Supreme Court af-
53
firmed the constitutionality of the act, thereby affirming congressional
dominance in the field and effectively gave constitutional approval to the
guilt by association doctrine.54
Throughout the next five decades, Congress enacted various immi-
gration acts, designed to limit immigration for those who espoused con-. . 55
troversial views. The highlight in the entrenchment of guilt by associa-
48. See Keisha A. Gary, Congressional Proposals to Revive Guilt by Association: An
Ineffective Plan to Stop Terrorism, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 227, 230 (1994); see also Mitchell
C. Tilner, Ideological Exclusion of Aliens: The Evolution of a Policy, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
1 (1987).
49. See Gary, supra note 48, at 230.
50. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213-14.
51. See Gary, supra note 48, at 230; see also Leonard David Egert, Note, Grant-
ing Foreigners Free Speech Rights: The End of Ideological Exclusions?, 8 CARnozo ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 721, 724-25 (1990).
52. Egert, supra note 51, at 724 (quoting Act of March 3, 1903). The Act did
not define "anarchist", but a person described as being excluded by this Act was
one who "disbelieves in or who is opposed to all organized government ... or who
advocates or who teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assault-
ing or killing of any officer or officers, either of... the Government of the United
States or of any other organized government, because of his or their official char-
acter .... " Gary, supra note 48, at 230; see also Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 38,
32 Stat 1213, 1221.
53. See United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904). John
Turner, a British citizen and labor organizer, was arrested and ordered deported
for his announcement in a public speech that he was an anarchist. See id. at 280-
81. In an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Turner charged that the
ideological exclusion was unconstitutional because Congress had exceeded its
powers. See id. at 289. Turner also challenged the 1903 Immigration Act based
upon his First Amendment freedom of speech or belief. See id. The Court held
the Congress had the plenary power to exclude whomever it chooses for whatever
reasons, including ideological grounds. See id. at 291.
54. See Gary, supra note 48, at 230.
55. See Act of February 20, 1907, ch. 1134 § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 899 (preventing
those who believe in polygamy from immigrating to the United States); Act of Feb-
1192 (Vol. 24
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tion came with the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act in 1952. This
Act gave government officials wide, unchecked discretion to exclude per-
sons on ideological grounds, presuming aliens automatically guilty of be-
ing a threat to the United States because of their beliefs and associations. 7
The McCarran-Walter Act survived virtually intact for twenty-five
years. In 1977, Congress passed the McGovern Amendment. This
permitted excludable aliens the right to apply for a waiver when their ex-
clusion was based on membership in an organization deemed threatening
under the mandates of McCarran-Walter. 60
Finally, in a sweeping overhaul of United States immigration law,
Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990. This Act• 62
served to effectively repeal McCarran-Walter. All ideological, associa-
tional, or speech grounds for exclusion were repealed. Congress finally
ruary 5, 1917, ch. 29 § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-78 (stating "ideology" is grounds for de-
portation); Act ofJune 5, 1920, ch. 251 § 1, 41 Stat. 1008, 1009 (limiting immigra-
tion to those not involved in "questionable organizations"); Alien Registration Act
of 1940, ch. 439, tit. II, § 23, 54 Stat. 670, 673 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940))
(excluding and deporting those who believed in or advocated proscribed doc-
trines); Act of May 25, 1948, ch. 338, 62 Stat. 268 (excluding those who posed a
threat to public safety); Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 22, 64 Stat. 987,
1006-07 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101, 1182 (1982)) (preventing com-
munists and fascists from immigrating to the United States).
56. McCarran-Walter Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1990)).
57. See id.; see also Gary, supra note 48, at 235 (stating that McCarran-Walter
Act gave government officials significant discretion in excluding persons on ideo-
logical grounds because of their beliefs and associations).
58. See Gary, supra note 48, at 236.
59. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
105, Tit. I, § 21, 91 Stat. 848 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1988) (re-
pealed 1990).
60. See id. The text of the statute reads:
The Secretary of State should, within 30 days of receiving an application
for a non-immigrant visa by any alien who is excludable from the United
States by reason of membership in or affiliation with a proscribed organi-
zation but who is otherwise admissible to the United States, recommend
that the Attorney General grant the approval necessary for the issuance
of a visa to such alien, unless the Secretary of State determines that the
admission of such alien would be contrary to the security interests of the
United States.... Nothing in this section may be construed as authoriz-
ing or requiring the admission to the United States of any alien who is
excludable for reasons other than membership in or affiliation with a
proscribed organization.
Id.
61. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 § 212, 104 Stat. 4978 (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Supp. II 1996)).
62. See Gary, supra note 48, at 240.
63. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 § 212(a) (3), 104 Stat.
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refuted puilt by association as a guiding force in United States immigra-
tion law.
3. Xenophobia
History demonstrates that governments have tried to restrict contro-
versial beliefs through government directives. The United States' in-
volvement in World War I significantly altered Congress' perception of
the First Amendment. 5 A national mood of great anxiety and fear of for-
eigners generally, communists specifically, as well as others viewed as sub-
versive spread throughout the nation. The first piece of legislation
passed in response to citizens' concerns was the Espionage Act of 1917."
(a) Classes of excludable aliens
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following describes
classes of excludable aliens who are ineligible to receive visas and who
shall be excluded from admission into the United States: ...
(3) Security and related grounds
(A) In general
Any alien who a consular officer or the Attorney General knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe, seeks to enter the United States to engage
solely, principally, or incidentally in -
(i) any activity to violate any law of the United States relat-
ing to espionage or sabotage or to violate or evade any law
prohibiting the export from the United States of goods,
technology, or sensitive information,
(ii) any other unlawful activity, or
(iii) any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or
the control or overthrow of, the Government of the United




Any alien who -
(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity, or
(II) a consular officer or the Attorney General knows, or
has reasonable ground to believe, is likely to engage after
entry in any terrorist activity is excludable. An alien who is
an officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the Pal-
estinian Liberation Organization is consider, for the pur-
poses of this chapter to be engaged in terrorist activity.
Id.
64. See Gary, supra note 48, at 240.
65. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 37, at 1008; see also Plotkin supra note
64, at 627 (stating "[t]he first modern wave of First Amendment litigation arose
out of federal legislation passed during World War I and its aftermath.").
66. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 37, at 1008; see also Plotkin, supra note
38, at 627 (noting the "United States involvement in the War and the concurrent
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia created a national mood of great anxiety and fear
of foreigners, Communists, and others viewed as subversive both to the war effort
and to the nation as a whole.").
67. See Act ofJune 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219. The Espionage Act
1194 [Vol. 24
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In 1919 the Secretary General of the Socialist Party in the United
States was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917.68
Schenck v. United States represents the first time that the United States Su-
preme Court addressed the modern notion of free speech.69 Schenck's
alleged violation came as a result of his printing and distributing to en-
listed men and potential draftees, a document which argued that the con-
scription violated the Thirteenth Amendment.70 The charge further al-
leged that the document "[i]n impassioned language... intimated that
conscription was despotism in its worst form and a monstrous wrong
against humanity in the interest of Wall Street's chosen few."71  The
document further urged readers to "Assert Your Rights" by opposing the
draft. 72 Schenck was found guilty of causing and attempting to cause in-
subordination in the military forces of the United States and of obstruct-
ing the recruiting and enlistment of the armed forces during wartime.73
The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.74
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, accepted the doctrine of
constructive intent,7 5 in which Schenck's intent to violate the Espionage76
Act could be inferred from his act of publication and distribution. Jus-
tice Holmes then established the "clear and present danger" test for in-
citement to lawless action. The Court held that Congress has a right to
restrict intentional speech if "the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
of 1917 prohibited, inter alia, "during wartime: (1)causing or attempting to cause
insubordination in the United States military forces, (2) obstructing or conspiring
to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States, and (3) us-
ing or conspiring to use the mails for the transmission of materials declared to be
non-mailable by the Postmaster General." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
50 (1919) (citing the Espionage Act of 1917); see also NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 37, at 1009; Plotkin, supra note 38, at 627.
68. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 50-51. Schenck was convicted of violating the Es-
pionage Act for distributing a circular designed to influence people to obstruct
the draft. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. The document stated "[d]o not submit to intimidation.., your
right to assert your opposition to the draft.., if you do not assert and support
your rights, you are helping to deny and disparage rights which it is the solemn
duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain." Id. at 51.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 47.
74. See id. at 53.
75. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 37, at 1009.
76. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51. The Court stated that the evidence of publica-
tion and distribution was sufficient to demonstrate intent because "the document
would not have been sent unless it had been intended to have some effect, and
[the court does] not see what effect it could be expected to have upon persons
subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out." Id.
19981 1195
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prevent.
"7 7
Schenck's actions, which obstructed the recruitment for the armed
forces, were an example of a substantive evil for which he could constitu-
tionally be convicted. The government needed to prove his intent to ob-
struct recruitment, as well as the fact that his speech had the natural ten-
dency to bring about such obstruction.7 9 This standard of review became
known as the "bad tendency" test.8 ° Restricted speech was allowable so
long as the speech's "natural tendency and reasonably probable effect"
81
was to cause unlawful action.
77. Id.; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). Justice Holmes, arguing for the adoption of the "marketplace of ideas"
approach stated, "[t]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market." Id. at 618. Further, Justice Holmes
stated that people should be free to express unpopular opinions, "unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing pur-
poses of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country." Id. at
630; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring). Justice Brandeis, arguing for the usage of the "clear and present danger"
test, stated that suppressing speech requires "a reasonable ground to fear that se-
rious evil will result if free speech is practiced." Id. Further, he argued that there
must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is both seri-
ous and imminent. See id. Lastly, he argued that without incitement, advocacy
alone is not ajustification for denying free speech. See id.
78. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919); see also Plotkin, supra
note 38, at 628 (stating "[o]bstruction of recruitment for the armed forces was one
such evil for which Schenck could constitutionally be convicted if he had the in-
tent to obstruct recruitment or if his speech had the natural tendency to bring
about such obstruction...").
79. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
80. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927). Whitney was con-
victed of violating the California Criminal Syndicalism Act by assisting in the or-
ganization of the Communist Labor Party of California. See id. The Statute de-
fined criminal syndicalism as any doctrine "advocating, teaching or aiding and
abetting.., crime, sabotage... or unlawful acts of force and violence" to effect
political or economic change. Id. at 359 (quoting the California Criminal Syndi-
calism Act). The Supreme Court upheld her conviction. See id. at 379. Justice
Brandeis, in his concurrence, stated
But even advocacy of [law] violation however reprehensible morally, is
not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short
of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be
immediately acted on.... No danger flowing from speech can be
deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended
is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full dis-
cussion.
Id. at 376(Brandeis, J., concurring); see also NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 37, at
1012(stating that the test used by the court in Whitney became known as the bad
tendency test).
81. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919). Debs was convicted for
violating the Espionage Act of 1917. See id. Debs, a prominent Socialist of the
time, allegedly encouraged listeners and readers to obstruct the recruiting service.
See id. at 211. Debs published a document which read "[w]e brand the declaration
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In Abrams v. United States, the defendants, all Russian nondeclarant
aliens, were charged with conspiring during wartime to print publications
which were intended to harm the reputation of the United States gov-
ernment and which were intended to "incite, provoke, and encourage re-. • .,,83
sistance to the United States in [the war effort] This constituted a vio-
lation of the Espionage Act of 1918.84 The Supreme Court held that
advocacy may be prohibited even if it is not directly intended to bring
about a harm which is within the power of the government to prevent, if
the natural consequence of the advocated acts is to bring about such
harm.85 In his dissent, Justice Holmes stated "a deed is not done with in-
tent to produce a consequence unless that consequence is the aim of the
deed." Holmes advocated the use of the "clear and present danger" test
when he stated "[i] t is only the present danger of immediate evil or an in-
tent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the ex-
pression of opinion where private rights are not concerned."
87
4. McCarthyism
Throughout the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court re-
viewed numerous cases involving members of the Communist Party.
These cases typically centered on state organizations attempting to pro-. 88
hibit or punish Communist Party membership. When the Court found a
strong state interest in disclosure and a close connection between that in-
terest and the information sought, it upheld forced disclosure of associa-
tional ties. 89
a. The Smith Act
In 1940, Congress passed the Smith Act.90 The Act prohibited the
acquisition or holding of knowing membership in any organization which
of war by our Government as a crime against the people of the United States and
against the nations of the world. In all modem history there has been no war
more unjustifiable than the war in which we are about to engage." Id. at 216; see
also NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 37, at 1009.
82. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
83. Id. The article at issue stated "[t] he Russian Revolution cries: Workers of
the World! Awake! Rise! Put down your enemy and mine! Yes friends, there is
only one enemy of the workers of the world and that is CAPITALISM.... Awake!
Awake you Workers of the World! REVOLUTIONISTS!" Id. at 620.
84. See id. at 617-18. The Espionage Act of 1917 was amended to include the
kinds of activities with which the defendants were charged. See id.
85. See id. at 623-24.
86. Id. at 627.
87. Id. at 628.
88. See Steinman, supra note 43, at 366(stating that in the 1950s and 1960s,
the Court frequently upheld legislative policies requiring the disclosure of indi-
vidual's possible Communist Party affiliations).
89. See id.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940).
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advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force
or violence. 9' Following its passage, at the height of the Cold War, the
Court reviewed a series of cases challenging the constitutionality of the92
act. The Smith Act was challenged as an unconstitutional infringement
upon their rights to associational privacy.93
The first case challenging the constitutionality of the Smith Act was
Dennis v. United States.94 Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Court, ap-
plied the "clear and present danger" test.95 He stated that the Smith Act
prohibited willful advocacy of the overthrow of Government by force or
violence. 96
Prohibiting the organization of any group advocating overthrow of
Government, the Court held, is not unconstitutional on the ground that it
stifles ideas and violates guarantees of free speech and press, because it is
directed at advocacy, not discussion.9 7 Justice Vinson further stated, "[i]f
Government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to
indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a course whereby they
will strike when the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the
Government is required. "9s The Court adopted a balancing test for pro-
tecting the freedom of association stating "in each case [courts] must ask
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary 
to avoid the danger.
" 9 In hi
concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter stated "[t]hroughout our deci-
sions there has recurred a distinction between the statement of an idea
which may prompt its hearers to take unlawful action, and advocacy that
such action be taken." 100
The Court upheld the trial court's ruling that the requisite danger
91. See id.
92. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 37, at 1008.
93. See id.
94. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). In Dennis, petitioner was convicted of conspiring to
organize the Communist Party of the United States as a group to teach and advo-
cate the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence.
See id. at 494.
95. See id. at 508. The Court stated "In this case we are squarely presented
with the application of the "clear and present danger" test..." See id.
96. See id. at 502. The Court stated, "Congress did not intend to eradicate the
free discussion of political theories, to destroy the. traditional rights of Americans
to discuss and evaluate ideas without fear of governmental sanction." Id.
97. See id. The Court stated," [t] he very language of the Smith Act negates the
interpretation which petitioners would have us impose on that Act. It is directed
at advocacy, not discussion." Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 37, at 1008 (stating that the
Dennis Court balanced the danger of government overthrow coupled with the
probability of such action against the individual's right to free speech).
100. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 545.
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existed to convict Dennis.'0 1 It stated that the "inflammable nature of the
world conditions" coupled with petitioner's "highly organized conspiracy
[supported] the finding that there was a sufficient danger to warrant the
application of the statute."'
0 2
Five years after deciding Dennis, the Court once again reviewed the
constitutionality of the Smith Act in Yates v. United States.03 In Yates, peti-
tioners were prosecuted for "conspiring to advocate and teach the over-
throw of the government by force and violence and to organize, as the
Communist Party of the United States, a society of persons who so advo-
cate and teach, with intent of causing overthrow of government by force
and violence."
10 4
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, reiterated the Court's holding
in Dennis. °0 He stated the question for the Court was whether the evi-
dence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, supported
the conclusion that the Party engaged in language "reasonably and ordi-
narily calculated to incite persons to... action immediately or in the fu-
ture." 0 6 The advocacy of 'mere abstract doctrine of forcible overthrow"
according to Justice Harlan was protected speech. °7 Justice Harlan fur-
ther stated that the essence of the Dennis holding was that indoctrination
of a group in preparation for future violent action, as well as incitement to
108immediate action is not constitutionally protected. Specifically, advo-
cacy employing language of incitement found to be directed to action for
the accomplishment of forcible overthrow, or to violence as a rule or
principle of action does not fall within the First Amendment.' 9
However, the Yates Court stated that the district court held "that
mere doctrinal justification of forcible overthrow, if engaged in with the
intent to accomplish overthrow, is punishable per se under the Smith
Act."n ° The Court held "[t] hat sort of advocacy, even though uttered with
the hope that it may ultimately lead to violent revolution, is too remote
from concrete action to be regarded as the kind of indoctrination pre-
paratory to action which was condemned in Dennis.""'
Therefore, the Court held that Yates' mere teaching of Communist
theory, including the teaching of moral propriety or even moral necessity
for a resort to force and violence, did not constitute preparing a group for
101. See id. at 494.
102. Id. at 510-11.
103. 354 U.S. 298(1957).
104. Id.




109. SeeYates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 321(1957).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 322.
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violent action and inciting it to such action.1 12
b. Other Anti-Communist Legislation
In Barenblatt v. United States,' the Court upheld convictions for con-
tempt of Congress of persons who refused to divulge whether they were or
ever had been members of the Communist Party. The court reasoned
that the state's interest in self-preservation outweighed the individual's
rights to associational privacy.•5
The Court came to a similar conclusion in Communist Party of the
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board.116 In this case, the Court
found constitutional legislation requiring the Communist Party to file reg-
istration statements listing all pertinent information of its officers and
members.!1 7 The Court distinguished this case from NAACP and Bates, by
stressing the significant state interest involved."
8
Similarly, in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,"g and In Re Anasta-
plo, 12 the Court upheld the right of states to deny admission to the bar
based upon an applicant's refusal to answer questions concerning their121
past or present affiliation with the Communist Party. The Court held
112. See id. at 321.
113. 360 U.S. 109 (1959). When summoned before Congress, Barenblatt re-
fused to answer questions regarding whether he was or ever had been a member
of the Communist Party. See id. See also Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431
(1961) (upholding conviction of individual who refused to answer question re-
garding past Communist Party membership); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S.
399 (1961) (upholding conviction of individual who refused to answer question
regarding present Communist Party membership).
114. See Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 113. Barenblatt was convicted under 2 U.S.C. §
192 (1950), which made it illegal for any person summoned to appear before
Congress to refuse to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry.
See id.
115. See id. at 134. "We conclude that the balance between the individual and
the governmental interests here at stake must be struck in favor of the latter, and
that therefore the provisions of the First Amendment have not been offended."
Id.
116. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). The act at issue in this case was the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Act. See id. at 4. This act required all Communist-action organizations
to register with the Attorney General. See id. at 8.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 102. "The public opprobrium and obloquy which may attach to
an individual listed ... as a member of a Communist-action organization is no less
considerable than that with which members of the NAACP were threatened in
NAACP and Bates." Id. However, this case is different "in the magnitude of the
public interests which the registration and disclosure bear to the protection of
those interests." Id.
119. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
120. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
121. In Konigsberg, the Court held that Konigsberg was not constitutionally jus-
tified in refusing to answer the certification committee's questions regarding his
Communist Party affiliation. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 36. In Anastaplo, the Court
held that the state could adopt a court-made rule precluding admission to the
[Vol. 241200
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that the state's interest in having only attorneys who are devoted to the law
in the broadest sense, outweighed the individual's right to free associa-122
tion. 123
In Scales v. United States, the court abandoned the balancing test
and set forth a new three-part test used to determine when the govern-
ment may prohibit or punish group membership.124 The Court held that
the government may punish membership in a group only if it proves that
a person is actively affiliated with a group, knowing of its illegal objectives,125
and has the specific intent to further those objectives. In Scales, the
Court affirmed the conviction of the Chairman of the North Carolina and
South Carolina Districts of the Communist Party under the "membership
clause" of the Smith Act.126 This clause made a felony "the acquisition or
holding of knowing membership in any organization which advocates the. .127
overthrow of the Government by force or violence." The Court held
that earlier precedents had established that "the advocacy with which we
are here concerned is not constitutionally protected speech, and it was
further established that a combination to promote such advocacy, albeit
under the aegis of what purports to be a political party, is not such associa-
tion as is protected by the First Amendment."
12
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, stated that the government's
practice of law of an applicant refusing to answer material questions concerning
his Communist Party affiliation. Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 82.
122. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 52. "With respect to... [the] same question of
Communist Party membership, we regard the State's interest in having lawyers
who are devoted to the law in its broadest sense ... as clearly sufficient to out-
weigh the minimal effect upon free association occasioned by compulsory disclo-
sure in the circumstances here presented." Id. See also Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 89.
"The State's interest in enforcing such a rule as applied to refusals to answer ques-
tions about membership in the Communist Party outweighs any deterrent effect
upon freedom of speech and association, and hence that such state action does
not offend the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
123. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
124. See id. at 229; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 944 (citing the
Court's three-part test used to determine the constitutionality of the government's
punishment of group membership).
125. See Scales, 367 U.S. at 229-30; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 944 (stating
that the Court has held that the government may punish membership only if it
proves that a person fulfills all three criteria); see also Nojeim Brief of Oral Testi-
mony, Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1995). In his testimony, Nojeim, Legislative Counsel
for the ACLU, stated that Scales "means that a person may not be punished merely
on account of membership in an organization, members of which advocate vio-
lence or illegal activity. Rather, the person himself or herself must also have at
least the specific intent to further the group's violent or unlawful aims." Id.
126. See Scales v. United States 367 U.S. 203, 203 (1961). The petitioners were
charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940). See id.
127. See id.
128. Scales, 367 U.S. at 228-29.
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ability to prohibit such speech included the authority to forbid associa-
tions to further these ideas and activities.' 29 He stated "[w]e can discern
no reason why membership, when it constitutes a purposeful form of
complicity in a group engaging in this same forbidden advocacy, should
receive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees of that
Amendment." 130 He further emphasized that Scales was being punished
for his active affiliation with the Communist Party, knowing of its illegal
objectives, and with proof that he "specifically intends to accomplish the
.. . .. . ,,131
aims of the organization by resort to wolence.
In Noto v. United States,132 the Court applied the three-part Scales test
and reversed a conviction for membership in the Communist Party.133
The Court held that the government failed to demonstrate the presence.. .134
of "illegal advocacy." The Court stressed that the speech was advocating135 --
abstract ideas. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, stated "the mere
abstract teaching.., of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a
resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for vio-
lent action and steeling it to such action." 136 He further stated "there
must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to vio-
lence now or in the future which is both sufficiently strong and sufficiently
pervasive... to justify the inference that such a call to violence may be
fairly imputed to the Party as a whole...."s7 There was no proof that138
Noto had the specific intent to further any illegal activities. Therefore,
the third element of the Scales test was missing and Noto's right to associa-
129. See id.; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 944 (stating that the gov-
ernment's power to suppress unprotected speech also included the power to re-
strict associations which further unprotected ideas and activities).
130. Id. at 229.
131. Id.
132. 367 U.S. 290 (1961). In Noto, petitioners were prosecuted under the
membership clause of the Smith Act. See id.
133. See id.; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 945 (stating that the Court
reversed a conviction for membership in the Communist Party because of the ab-
sence of "illegal activity").
134. Noto, 367 U.S. at 290.
135. See id. at 298-99; see also CHEMERNSKY, supra, note 37, at 945 (stating that
the Court focused on the advocacy of abstract ideas as opposed to incitement to
action).
136. Noto, 367 U.S. at 298.
137. Id. In Noto, "the Court found that an organization cannot be held crimi-
nally responsible for a call to violence issued by a limited subset of the individuals
in the group." Id.
138. See Noto, 367 U.S. at 298. The Court stated "surely the offhand remarks
that certain individuals hostile to the Party would one day be shot cannot demon-
strate more than the venomous or spiteful attitude of the Party towards its ene-
mies." Id. The Court further stated "there is no evidence that such acts of sabo-
tage were presently advocated; and it is present advocacy, and not an intent to
advocate in the future or a conspiracy to advocate in the future.., which is an
element of the crime under the membership clause." Id.
1202 [Vol. 24
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tional privacy could not be violated.'39
c. Defining the Freedom to Associate: The NAACP Cases
The two leading cases in defining the freedom to associate involve
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP).
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson'4 is the first Supreme Court deci-
sion to recognize freedom of association as a constitutional right. The
Court held that based upon the NAACP's "uncontroverted showing that
on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members
has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment,
threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility,"
the required disclosure of its membership and agent lists to the Alabama
Attorney General was likely to entail a substantial restraint lU on NAACP
members' exercise of their right to freedom of association. The Court
further held that such compelled disclosure might negatively impact
139. See id. at 299. The Court stated:
this element of the membership crime... must be judged strictissimi ju-
ris [according to the strictest law] for otherwise there is a danger that one
in sympathy with the legitimate aims of such an organization, but not
specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to violence, might be
punished for his adherence to lawful and constitutionally protected pur-
poses, because of other and unprotected purposes which he does not
share.
Id. at 299-300. The Court continued, "to permit an inference of advocacy from
evidence showing at best only a purpose or conspiracy to advocate in the future
would be to allow the jury to blur the lines of distinction between the various of-
fenses punishable under the Smith Act." Id. at 298-99. The ACLU emphasized
this reading of Noto in its testimony before Congress:
that a person who attends meetings of one of the groups, listens to every
speaker including those who advocate violence, then decides he supports
the lawful, but not the violent ends of the organization, cannot be held
accountable for violent acts of others. It also means that absent compel-
ling evidence, the group itself cannot be held accountable for the acts of
a member or sympathizer.
Nojeim Brief of Oral Testimony, Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1995) (statement of Gregory
T. Nojeim, Legislative Counsel, ACLU Washington Nat'l Office).
140. 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also Steinman, supra note 43, at 360 (stating that
NAACP v. Alabama is frequently cited as the first Supreme Court case to recognize
freedom of association).
141. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460; see also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 561 (1960). In Bates, the Court relied upon the same principles to protect the
privacy rights of NAACP members and contributors. See id. The Court concluded
that mandatory disclosure of such lists would significantly interfere with the mem-
bers' freedom of association. See id. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1962). In Gibson, the Court held that the state failed to es-
tablish a substantial relationship between the information sought and a compel-
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142
membership for fear of the consequences of exposure. Finally, the
Court held that Alabama had not demonstrated a compelling interest toou membership.14s3 codngy h
justify the deterrent effect upon group membership. Accordingly, the
judgment of contempt was reversed.
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware45 is the second Supreme Court case de-
fining the right to freely associate. The Court examined the danger of
permitting the government excessive latitude in branding groups as vio-. . . . . .. . 146
lent and characterizing their activities as conspiracies. In Claiborne, the
NAACP sponsored a nonviolent picketing protest as a means to boycott
white merchants. 47 However, it was undisputed that the NAACP also used
a group known as the "Black Hats" to watch stores and engage in certain
other "enforcement activities" that included acts of violence.1
The Court struck down the 130 conspiracy judgements entered in a
Mississippi state court.149 The Court held "the right to associate does not
lose all constitutional protection merely because some members of the
group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself• . ,,150 . .
is not protected." The Court stressed the danger of imposing liability
on the entire group for the actions of some of its members, absent ratifi-
cation or authorization of the unlawful conduct.15 ' Therefore, following
Claiborne, a law may not punish association without more, but it may pro-
142. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 463 (inviolability of privacy in group
association may in many circumstance be indispensable to preservation of freedom
of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs).
143. See id. at 466 (stating "we conclude that Alabama has fallen short of show-
ing a controlling justification for the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the
right to associate which disclosure of membership lists is likely to have").
144. See id. (holding "that the immunity from state scrutiny of membership
lists... is here so related to the right of the members to pursue their lawful private
interests privately and to associate freely.., as to come within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment").
145. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 903.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 908.
151. See id. at 933-34. The Court stated:
A massive and prolonged effort to change the social, political and eco-
nomic structure of a local environment cannot be characterized as a vio-
lent conspiracy simply by reference to the ephemeral consequences of a
relatively few violent acts. Such a characterization must be supported by
findings that adequately disclose the evidentiary basis for concluding that
specific parties agreed to use unlawful means, that carefully identify the
impact of such unlawful conduct, and that recognize the importance of
avoiding the imposition of punishment for constitutionally protected ac-
tivity.... A court must be wary of a claim that the true color of a forest is
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scribe association with an organization whose members strive to advance
the group's violent goals.
15 2
An individual's right to freedom of association is most directly in-
fringed if the government outlaws and punishes membership in a particu-153
lar group. The Supreme Court held that the government may punish
membership only if it demonstrates that a person is actively affiliated with
a group, knowing of its illegal objectives, and with the specific intent to
further those objectives.154
5. Recent Application: American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee v. Reno
A recent ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals "casts serious
doubt on the constitutionality of this law." 55  In American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee v. Reno, 15 6 the court ruled that people cannot be
punished for fund raising for a so-called "terrorist organization" unless
they have the specific intent to further the group's unlawful objectives."'
In Reno, the court applied the "clear and present danger" test set forth by
the United States Supreme Court in Brandenburg. 15 The court stated that
advocacy may be punished only if it is directed to inciting or producin
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
The government must establish a knowing affiliation and specific intent to160
further those illegal aims. Further, the court held that guilt by associa-
152. See id. at 920.
153. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 944 (stating that it is obvious that an
individual's freedom of association is most directly infringed if the government
outlaws and punishes membership in a group).
154. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961). See also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 944 (stating that an individual must be actively en-
gaged with a group and specifically intend to further the group's illegal objec-
tives).
155. David Cole, Terrorizing the Constitution, THE NATION 11, 13 (1996).
156. 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995). In Reno, the INS arrested the eight named
aliens in January, 1987. See id. at 1052. They were detained for several weeks in
maximum security prisons, then released pending the outcome of their deporta-
tion hearings. See id. The INS charged all of the individuals under provisions of
the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 for membership in an organization, the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). See id. at 1053. The PFLP (a later
designated "foreign terrorist organization") allegedly advocates the doctrine of
world communism. See id.
157. See id. "The right of association is a basic constitutional freedom...
[that] lies at the foundation of a free society. Government cannot deny rights and
privileges solely because of a citizen's association with an unpopular organization."
Id. at 1063.
158. See id.; see alsoAbrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (analyzing the
clear and present danger test).
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AEDPA section 1189 fails to provide the procedural requirements
necessary for the government to restrict an individual's liberty and prop-
erty interests. Similarly, the government fails to demonstrate a compelling
reason for AEDPA section 1182 which restricts and individual's right to
freely associate. Each will be examined in turn.
B. AEDPA Section 1189: Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Violates Procedural Due Process
1. Background
The focus of procedural due process is on procedural questions and
procedural guarantees. 62 The court's concern is with whether particular
governmental decisions are made with the kind of procedural regulari,
that renders that decision procedurally valid in terms 
of due process.
Only governmental decisions that deprive a particular individual of an in-
terest in life, liberty, or property raise such procedural due process ques-
tions.16 Liberty interests generally refer to the ability to enjoy the privi-
leges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
165
free people. A property interest requires that the individual have a le-•, 166
gitimate claim of entitlement. This entails more than an abstract needS 167
or desire or unilateral expectation of benefit. The government must
have made an individual determination about a particular individual or
organization, and that individual determination must impose a burden on
or deny a benefit to that individual in a way which infringes that individ-
ual's life, liberty, or property interests.'68
2. Application to Section 1189
AEDPA section 1189 provides that the Secretary of State, after con-
161. See id.




165. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
166. See id. at 577.
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suiting with the Attorney General, will designate political groups based in
other countries as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The Secretary is
authorized to designate a group as a terrorist organization if she finds (1)
that it is a foreign organization, (2) that it engages in terrorist activities,
and (3) the terrorist activities threaten the security of United States na-
tionals or the National Security of the United 
States. 7 0
The first question under procedural due process analysis is whether171
there has been a deprivation of liberty or property. When liberty or
property interests are at stake, the second question concerns the proce-172
dural protections necessary. The focus is on notice and opportunity for
an adjudicative hearing. Due process requires an opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The epitome
of a due process hearing is a full judicial trial on the merits.17 5 However,175
this type of procedure is not required in all cases. Therefore, the ques-
tion is how much procedure must be accorded the individual being de-
prived of the liberty or property interest.177
The determination regarding how much procedural protection is re-
quired in a given context is made by balancing the relevant governmental
and individual interests according to the three factor test established in
169. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (1) (Supp. 111996). To date, the Secretary of State
has designated thirty groups "foreign terrorist organizations." They are: Abu Nidal
Organization (ANO), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Armed Islamic Group (GIA),
Aum Shinrikyo (Aum), Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-Hawatmeh Faction (DFLP), HAMAS (Islamic Resistance
Movement), Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA), Hizballah (Party of God), Gama'a al-
Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG), Japanese Red Army (RA), al-Jihad, Kach, Kahane
Chai, Khmer Rouge, Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE), Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents (FPMR/D), Mujahe-
din-e Khalq Organization (MEK, MKO), Nation Liberation Army (ELN), Palestine
Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ), Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction
(PLF), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Columbia (FARC), Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 No-
vember), Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), Revolution-
ary People's Struggle (ELA), Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL), Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). See OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORIsM, U.S. DEPARTMENT Or STATE, (October 8, 1997).
170. See8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (Supp. 111996).
171. See KAPLIN, supra note 162, at 144.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id. (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
175. See id. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
176. See Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-48 (1985)
(holding that a pretermination hearing need not be elaborate and because the
plaintiff was provided the right to respond to the allegations of false statements on
his application that was sufficient to satisfy due process requirements).
177. See KAPLIN, supra note 162, at 144.
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Matthews v. Eldridge. The court must balance the private interest that
will be affected by official action; the risk of erroneous deprivation of such
interest through procedural safeguards, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and the government's in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements would en-
tail.179
a. Individual Interest
The private interest that will be affected by official action involves the
fundamental rights of an or anization. 10 This is the highest private inter-
est an individual possesses. The designation of foreign terrorist organi-
zations involves both liberty and property interests. AEDPA section 1189
infringes on the organization's ability to make contracts, be free from the
stigma associated with being designated terroristic, and the ability to enjoy
the privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men. Similarly, because designation results in freezing the
organizations assets, there is also a property interest at stake.183
b. Procedures Provided
The second stage of the Matthews test involves the procedures pro-
vided by the government. 184 The procedural safeguards provided byS. .185
AEDPA section 1189 are very minimal. An essential principle of due
process, however, is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be pre-
ceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
178. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
179. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
180. Fundamental rights include the freedom from bodily restraint, right to
contract, right to engage in an occupation, right to acquire knowledge, right to
marry, right to rear children, right to worship, right to be free from stigma, right
to one's reputation, honor, and the right to enjoy the privileges long recognized
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. See Board of Regents
of State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
181. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 332-333; see also Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).
182. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 572. Roth states that liberty interests include the right
to contract and "'generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized... as essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.'" Id.
183. Roth generally describes what types of interests could be considered prop-
erty rights. See id. at 576-78.
184. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
185. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (b)(1) (Supp. 11 1996). Due process procedures in-
clude:
[A] dvance notice of the hearing date, opportunity to tell one's "side of
the story" to an impartial decision maker, opportunity to present wit-
nesses, opportunity to submit documentary evidence, opportunity to
cross-examine adverse witnesses, opportunity to discover adverse evi-
dence, the right to counsel or other representation, maintenance of a
hearing record, and the right to a decision on the record.
KAPLIN, supra note 162, at 144.
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Notice. The only notice provided to organization designated under
AEDPA section 1189 constitutes publication in the Federal Register.1
87
This notice applies after the designation and is only for the purpose of
appeal. 18 There is no notice given prior to the designation by the Secre-189
tary. Thus the notice requirement of due process is simply not met.
Opportunity to be heard. When protected interests are implicated, the190
right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount. Under AEDPA sec-
tion 1189, there is no opportunity for such a hearing.'9' Along with the
inability to have a pre-designation hearing, AEDPA section 1189 also fails
to provide affected organizations with any form of meaningful opportu-• 192
nity to be heard post-designation. The terrorist organization can suc-
cessfully appeal the distinction in court only if it can show that the desig-
nation was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion not in accordance
with the law, or lacking in substantial support."193 This judicial review is
largely illusory. The standard for what qualifies a group as terrorist relies
on the Secretary's judgment as to what constitutes threats to our national
security.
This standard is extremely deferential. Few courts if any would
second guess the Secretary in this area, because there is no way to measure'95
activities which threaten the national security. Similarly, because the
determination may be based on secret evidence available only to the Sec-
retary, it would be impossible for the group to even know the accusations196
against it so that it could effectively meet the charges. Finally, few "for-
eign terrorist organizations" are allowed into the United States to chal-
lenge the Secretary's finding, thus emphasizing the lack of meaningful re-
197
view.
AEDPA section 1189 fails to provide the procedural due process re-
quired by the Constitution. Generally, cases involving the fundamental
186. See id.
187. See8 U.S.C. § 1189 (b) (1) (Supp. 111996).
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1975).
191. See8 U.S.C. § 1189 (b)(1) (Supp. I 1996).
192. See id.
193. Id. "The terrorist organization can successfully appeal the designation in
court only if it can show that the Secretary of State's designation was arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion not in accordance with the law, or lacking in sub-
stantial support." Id.
194. This deferential standard has been criticized. See Abdeen Jabara, Political
Repression By Another Name: The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1995, NATIONAL
LAWYER'S GuILD, Winter 1997, at 38, 40.
195. See THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPLICATIONS OF
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rights of an individual require pre-determination as well as post-198
determination hearings. These hearings emulate full judicial trials on
the merits.1 9 AEDPA section 1189 fails to provide this type of hearing.200
even on appeal. There is no opportunity to cross examine witnesses or--- 201 -
confront an organization's accusers. Instead, there is an ex parte in
camera hearing to determine the Government's evidence coupled with an
organization's opportunity to present its evidence. 22 The procedures
provided are therefore inadequate.
c. Government Interest
The Government has a very strong interest in protecting the national
security of the United States. Similarly, the Government has a strong in-
terest in the fiscal effects which additional or substitute procedural re-
203quirements would entail .
However, the essence of due process is the requirement that a person
in jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the case against him and
have an opportunity to meet it. All that is necessary is that the proce-
dures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the capacities and
circumstances of those who are to be heard, to ensure that they are given205
meaningful opportunity to present their case. AEDPA section 1189 fails
to provide this opportunity. The cost of additional procedures is out-
weighed by the significant rights at stake.
3. Conclusion
Presidential administrations throughout the history of the United
States have tried to create a balance between protecting United States na-
tional security and protecting an individual's procedural due process
rights. The Supreme Court traditionally construes measures restricting an
individual's fundamental rights very rigidly and provides many safeguards206
to ensure fairness. AEDPA section 1189 is another example of a legisla-
tive directive which requires strict scrutiny. The designation of foreign
terrorist organizations results in the same types of discrimination for
which the Supreme Court traditionally requires significant procedural
198. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).
199. See KAPLIN, supra note 162, at 144.
200. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (b)(2) (Supp. 11 1996). The statute reads, "[r]eview
under this subsection shall be based solely upon the administrative record, except
that the Government may submit, for ex parte and in camera review, classified in-
formation used in making the designation." Id.
201. See id.
202. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a)(3)(B) (Supp. 111996).
203. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 34748 (1975).
204. See id. at 348.
205. See id. at 349 (citations omitted).
206. See KAPLIN, supra note 162, at 145.
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safeguards. °7 AEDPA section 1189 fails to provide these safeguards.
C. Section 1182: Criminalizing Fund Raising and Humanitarian Aid
Violates the Freedom of Association
1. Scales Analysis
The Scales test states that the Government may punish membership
in an organization only if it can demonstrate a person is actively affiliated
with a group, knowing of its illegal objectives, with the specific intent to
further those objectives. 28 The Court has held that membership within a
group constitutes active affiliation.2 9 The Court has further viewed the
components of the test as a whole, based on the totality of the circum-210
stances. 211
In Scales, the Court analogized this test to criminal complicity. The
Court stated that society cannot be powerless against those who work to
bring about dangerous behavior. 212 The Court focused on the difference
between the fact of membership and the underlying substantive illegal
conduct. " The Government must demonstrate the individual's criminal
214
liability to satisfy Scales. 21 Failure to do so results in a violation of one's
right to freely associate.
Criminalizing the legal, political, or charitable activities of a group
constitutes guilt by association. The practical effect of this law "will be
207. See id.
208. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961).
209. See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961).
210. See Scales, 367 U.S. at 229.
211. See id. at 226. The Court stated:
Complicity has been defined thus: A person is an accomplice of another
person in commission of a crime if:
(a) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of
the crime, he
(1) commanded, requested, encouraged or provoked such
other person to commit it; or
(2) aided, agreed to aid or attempted to aid such other person
in planning or committing it * * *
(b) acting with knowledge that such other person was committing or
had the purpose of committing the crime, he knowingly, substan-
tially facilitated its commission.
Id. at 227 n.17 (quoting AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)
tentative draft No. 1 (1953)).
212. See Scales, 367 U.S. at 225.
213. See id. at 229.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNIION, ACLU BACKGROUND BRIEFING:
HOUSE TO CONSIDER OMNIBUS COUNTER-CONSTITUTION ACT (March 31, 1995). "To
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devastating to the huge number of groups and individuals in the United
States who are concerned about their... countries of origin, or about the
welfare and human rights of people around the world." The legislation
makes giving a pencil to a school operated by a group designated a "for-
218eign terrorist organization" a criminal act.
Had this bill been enacted a few years ago, it would have been illegal
to provide support to the African National Congress in South Africa, be-
cause the United States once regarded the ANC as a "terrorist" organiza-
tion.2 1 9 Further, it would have been illegal for human rights groups, relief
organizations and church-related groups to go to Central America and
220provide anything but medicine and religious materials.
In some parts of the world, relief organizations have no choice but to
work with organizations likely to be designated as "terrorist" organizations
221by the Secretary of State. 2 Oftentimes, relief organizations must pay fees
or bribes to these groups. To furnish any funds, oods, or services to
such a group even in relief mission, would be a crime.
The Aideed group in Somalia, headed by Mohammed Farah Aideed
would likely have been designated a terrorist organization. 224 In order to
get their supplies to the needy people, many non-government organiza-
tions were required to give portions of their supplies and to hire guards
225supplied by the Aideed group. Under this Act, paying off those guards
226with supplies or hiring the guards would be a criminal act. Even though
the intent of the non-government organization was to save lives and not to
further the violent, illegal activity of the Aideed group, the act itself is still
be consistent with the Constitution, effective anti-terrorism legislation can prohibit
only unlawful activity, not mere associations, because to do otherwise would be to
operate on nothing less than guilt by association." Id.
217. NATIONAL COALITION TO PROTECT POLITICAL FREEDOM, COALTION
CONDEMNS GOVERNMENT RELEASE OF LIST OF FOREIGN "TERRoIsT ORGANIZATIONS"
AS ATTACK ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SPEECH, ASSOCIATION, AND RELIGION (Oc-
tober 8, 1997).
218. See THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPLICATIONS OF
THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 1995 (1996).
219. See id.
220. See THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE
HOUSE TERRORISM BILL, H.R. 2768 (February 9, 1996); see also Peter Erlinder, Cure
is Worse Than Disease: Antiterrorist Law Threatens American Freedom, STAR TRIBUNE
(Mpls.), October 20, 1997, at A13. "[Tlhe constitutionally protected freedom of
Americans to supply international humanitarian assistance in areas of conflict will
be extinguished by changes in U.S. foreign policy or political administrations." Id.
221. See THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPLICATIONS OF












Similarly, the Secretary of State could designate the Zapatistas in
Mexico a "foreign terrorist organization. 228 The Zapatistas employ both
lawful and unlawful means to press for land reform and political reform in
229
Chiapas, Mexico. Once so designated, it would then become illegal to
do relief work in Chiapas, if the relief organization furnished money or
goods to any institution affiliated with the Zapatistas.230
The Scales Court specifically sought to avoid exactly what the AEDPA231
section 1182 seeks to do. "There must be clear proof that a defendant
specifically intends to accomplish the aims of the organization by resort to
violence." An individual who seeks to advance legitimate aims and poli-.. .. .233
cies through an organization does not fall within Scales. The requisite
specificity to bring about the illegal aims of the organization is lacking.234
"Such a person may be foolish, deluded, or perhaps merely optimistic, but
he is not.., a criminal.
" 235
The elements of the Scales test must be judged "strictissimi juris" be-
cause otherwise, there is a danger that one in sympathy with the legitimate
aims of such an organization, but without the specific intent to further its
illegal activities, might be punished for his adherence to lawful and consti-
236
tutionally protected purposes. The Constitution does not allow such
237
prosecutions.
The Government cannot prove criminal liability by the affected indi-
vidual in all cases under AEDPA section 1182. AEDPA section 1182
criminalizes raising and contributing funds, donating educational and
humanitarian supplies, or providing lodging, transportation, or other
238
forms of material support to designated foreign terrorist groups.
AEDPA section 1182 creates many Freedom of Association concerns.
It significantly restricts peoples' constitutional liberties in the name of
fi " " . ~239 .. , . .. . ,
fighting terrorism. It is not only "misguided", but "counterproductive"









235. Id. at 230.
236. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961).
237. See id.
238. See8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (Supp. 111996).
239. See THE AMERICAN CiVL LIBERTIES UNION, CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPUCATIONS OF
THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 1995 (1996).
240. Cole, supra note 155, at 13.
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association.14' As noted earlier, this notion was attempted during the
McCarthy era, with disastrous results.14 The purpose of the Act is to stifle
243
aid to foreign terrorist groups. Past United States legislation aimed at
244
preventing citizens from supporting foreign groups' criminal activities.
This law goes one step further and criminalizes supporting that group's
lawful activities. This law violates an individual's right to freely associate as
245
established by the First Amendment.
2. AAADC Analysis
246
In AADC v. Reno, the court coupled the Scales test with the clear247
and present danger test. The court ruled that advocacy may be pun-
ished only if it is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to produce such a result. The court further stated that the
Government must establish a knowing affiliation and specific intent to fur-
249
ther those illegal aims.
As noted previously, AEDPA section 1182 fails the Scales test. There-
fore, under AAADC, the only remaining analysis involves the clear and
present danger test.
The clear and present danger test requires "a reasonable ground to
fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced."250 There must
be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is both se-251
rious and imminent. Without incitement, advocacy alone is not a justi-
fication for denying free association.25 2
AEDPA section 1182 fails to meet the clear and present danger crite-
ria. Supporting the legal, political, or charitable activities of a group does
253
not constitute incitement to lawless action. The criteria of AEDPA sec-
tion 1182 fail to address this requirement. The government cannot dem-
onstrate that criminalizing humanitarian aid to lawful institutions affili-
ated with foreign terrorist organizations constitutes a clear and present
danger. There can be no showing that this act "so imminently threatens
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1189 & 1182 (Supp. 111996).
244. See supra Part H.C.
245. See supra Part II.C.
246. 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995).
247. See id. at 1063.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927).
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACLU BACKGROUND BRIEFING:
HOUSE TO CONSIDER OMNIBUS COUNTER-CONSTITUTION ACT (March 31, 1995).
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that an immediate check is required to save the country."2 54 Therefore,
AEDPA section 1182 fails the clear and present danger test.
3. Conclusion
AEDPA section 1182 fails to acknowledge the Court's requirements
governing permissible reasons for infringing upon an individual's right to
freely associate. The Government fails to demonstrate that affected indi-
viduals under AEDPA section 1182 are actively affiliated with an organiza-
tion, knowing of its illegal objectives, with the specific intent to further
those objectives.2 5 5 Therefore, AEDPA section 1182 unconstitutionally in-
fringes upon on individual's right to freely associate.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 vio-
lates an individual's associational and due process rights. The sections
providing for the Secretary of State creating a list of "foreign terrorist or-
ganizations", as well as the sections which criminalize international fund
raising and humanitarian aid represent a return of McCarthyism and guilt
by association. These measures simply do not represent a solution to the
problem of international terrorism.
Andy Pearson
254. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618 (1919).
255. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 225 (1961).
256. See NETWORK AGAINST THE "COUNTER-TERRORISM" Acr, THE ANTI-
TERRORISM AND EFFEcTIvE DEATH PENALTY Acr: REPRESSION UNDER THE GUISE OF
PROTECTING PEOPLE:
First they came for the Communists, and I didn't speak up because I
wasn't a Communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up
because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, but I
wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics, and I didn't
speak up because I was a Protestant. Then they came for me, and by that
time, no one was left to speak up.
Id. (quoting Pastor Martin Niemoeller).
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